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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a novel technique for the automatic type identification of arbitrary memory objects from
a memory dump. Our motivating application is debugging memory corruption problems in optimized, pro-
duction systems — a problem domain largely unserved by extant methodologies. We describe our algorithm
as applicable to any typed language, and we discuss it with respect to the formidable obstacles posed by
C. We describe the heuristics that we have developed to overcome these difficulties and achieve effective
type identification on C-based systems. We further describe the implementation of our heuristics on one C-
based system — the Solaris operating system kernel — and describe the extensions that we have added to
the Solaris postmortem debugger to allow for postmortem type identification. We show that our implemen-
tation yields a sufficiently high rate of type identification to be useful for debugging memory corruption
problems. Finally, we discuss some of the novel automated debuggingmechanisms that can be layered upon
postmortem type identification.
KEYWORDS: postmortem debugging; memory corruption; debugging production systems; debugging opti-
mized systems; false sharing; lock detection; feedback-based debugging
1 Introduction
While there are a myriad of different techniques for automatically debugging memory corruption
problems, they share one conspicuous trait: each induces a negative effect on run-time performance.
In the least invasive techniques the effect is merely moderate, but in many it is substantial — and
in none is the performance effect so slight as to allow the technique to be enabled at all times in
production code. As such, the applicability of these techniques is limited to reproducible memory
corruption problems in development environments. These techniques are ineffective for debugging the
most virulent memory corruption problems: non-reproducible problems in production environments.
The only data from such problems is the state of the system itself: when memory corruption induces
a fatal failure in the system, a snapshot of state is typically taken and copied to stable storage. To be
applicable to these memory corruption problems, automatic debugging techniques must assume an
optimized system, and restrict themselves to making use only of postmortem state.
Memory corruption problems have several variants, but a particularly common pathology is
a buffer overrun, in which a memory object is erroneously treated as a memory object of larger
size[SC91]. Because the errant subsystem stores to the memory beyond the bounds of the object,
this pathology can induce wildly varying manifestations: system failure is typically induced not by
the corrupting subsystem, but rather by a disjoint (and otherwise correct) subsystem that happens to
have a memory buffer adjacent to that of the errant subsystem. As Figure 1 shows, when debugging
In M. Ronsse, K. De Bosschere (eds), proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Automated Debugging (AADE-
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... ...
0xde4ecd10 0x29010601
0xde4ecd14 0x25000002
0xde4ecd18 0x06010201
0xde4ecd1c 0x08010201
0xde4ecd20 0x23000001
0xde4ecd24 0xde76b734
0xde4ecd28 0xdedfbc68
0xde4ecd2c 0xde769afc
... ...
✆
✞
☎
✝
✆
✞
☎
✝
Corrupted
buffer
Unknown
buffer
Figure 1: Example of buffer overrun memory corruption. The first word of the 16-byte buffer at address
0xde4ecd20 has been corrupted, inducing fatal error when the memory stored there (0x23000001) was inter-
preted as a pointer. The similarity between the corruption value and the contents of the buffer at address
0xde4ecd10 indicates that the code manipulating the unknown buffer is likely responsible for the corruption.
these problems postmortem it is often apparent based on buffer contents that one buffer has overrun
the other. The subsystem associated with the victimized buffer is known by virtue of that subsystem
having induced the fatal error; in order to make progress, the subsystem associated with the errant
buffer must be determined. In a system that makes widespread use of derived types, determining
the type of a buffer can often implicitly identify the subsystem — and at the very least, determining
the type considerably focuses the search for errant code.
We have developed an automatic technique for determining the type of an arbitrary memory
object from a memory dump of an optimized system. As many optimized systems are implemented
in C, we have developed some specific heuristics tomake our technique effective on C-based systems.
We have implemented these heuristics on Solaris for use in debugging Solaris kernel crash dumps,
and have in practice been able to achieve very high rates of type identification— typically better than
80 percent of all memory objects, and often better than 95 percent. This high rate of identification has
allowed our technique to be used to successfully debug otherwise undebuggable kernel memory
corruption problems.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses related work; Section 3
discusses our technique in general; Section 4 discusses the problems that a C-based system poseswith
our technique; Section 5 discusses the heuristics that we have developed to overcome the obstacles
outlined in Section 4; Section 6 discusses the details of our implementation; Section 7 describes other
applications of postmortem type identification; Section 8 outlines areas for future work.
2 Related work
There has been a substantial body of work devoted to debugging memory corruption problems in
development, including Purify[HJ92], Sabre-C[KLP88], Kendall’s bcc[Ken83], Steffen’s rtcc[Ste92],
and Jones and Kelly’s bounds checking[JK97]. Many of these require recompilation, and all of
them induce substantial performance impact, varying from as little as 130%[ABS94] to as much as
20,000%[KLP88]. None of these target production code explicitly, and Jones and Kelly even conclude
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that it is “unlikely that we could ever achieve the 10-15% performance loss that would be acceptable
if programs are to be distributed with bounds checks compiled in.”[JK97]
The problem of debugging memory corruption problems in production was explicitly identified
by Patil and Fischer in [PF95], in which they describe using idle processors to absorb their technique’s
substantial performance impact. Unfortunately, this is not practical in a general-purpose system: idle
processors cannot be relied upon to be available for extraneous processing. Indeed, in performance
critical systems any performance impact is often unacceptable.
Some memory allocators have addressed debugging problems in production by allowing their
behavior to be dynamically changed to provide greater debugging support[Bon94]. This allows op-
timal allocators to be deployed into production, while still allowing their debugging features to be
later enabled should problems arise. A common way for these allocators to detect buffer overruns is
to optionally place red zones around allocated memory. However, this only provides for immediate
identification of the errant code if stores to the red zone induce a synchronous fault. Such faults are
typically achieved by coopting the virtual memory system in some way — either by surrounding a
buffer with unmapped regions, or by performing a check on each access. The first has enormous cost
in terms of space, and the second in terms of time — neither can be acceptably enabled at all times.
Thus, these approaches are still only useful for reproducible memory corruption problems.
If memory corruption cannot be acceptably prevented in production code, then the focus must
shift to debugging the corruption postmortem. While the notion of postmortem debugging has ex-
isted since the earliest dawn of debugging[Gil51], there seems to have been very little work on post-
mortem debugging of memory corruption per se; such as it is, work on postmortem debugging has
focused on race condition detection in parallel and distributed programs. The lack of work on post-
mortem debugging is surprising given its clear advantages for debugging production systems —
advantages that were clearly elucidated by McGregor and Malone in [MM80]:
A major advantage of this method of obtaining information about a program’s malfunc-
tion is that there is virtually no runtime overhead in either space or speed. No extra trace
routines are necessary and the dump interpreting software is a separate system utility
which is only used when required. This is a facility which remains effective when a pro-
gram has passed into production use and is very effective in ‘nailing’ those occasional
bugs in a production environment.
The only nod to postmortem debugging of memory corruption seems to come from memory
allocators such as the slab allocator[Bon94] used by the Solaris kernel. This allocator can optionally
log information with each allocation and deallocation; in the event of failure, these logs can be used
to determine the subsystem allocating the overrun buffer. While this mechanism has proved to be
enormously useful in debugging memory corruption problems in the Solaris kernel, it is still far too
space- and time-intensive to be enabled at all times in production environments.
3 Object type identification
We seek to aid postmortem analysis by providing type identification for dynamically-allocated ob-
jects. In many systems, a memory dump due to fatal failure includes both compiler-supplied type
information and a mapping of static memory objects to their type[Lin90]; we wish to use this infor-
mation to develop type inferences for dynamically-allocated objects.
3.1 Initialization
We consume the memory dump, building a graph in which each node represents an allocated dy-
namic memory object and each edge represents a pointer from one memory object to another. (We
determine the pointers contained within a memory object by scanning its aligned locations for val-
ues that correspond to other dynamically allocated objects.) For each node, we store the base address
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static “foo_list”
0xde714060 ☎
✝ ✲
✝ ☎✞ ✆
known to be foo_t *
✆
✲✞
☎
✲✝
☎
✲✝
0xde714060
+0x0 0xde704078
+0x4 0xde701df0
+0x8 0xdefed090
+0xc 0x12e
0xde704078
+0x0 0xde711008
+0x4 0xde70a4c8
+0x8 0xde709de0
+0xc 0xa0
✲
✲
✲
0xdefed090
+0x0 0x1
+0x4 0xde5be840 ✲
0xde701df0
+0x0 0x646e6172
+0x4 0xba000000
Figure 2: Initialization. Each dynamically allocated memory object is a node; each pointer between objects is an
edge. Statically allocated objects such as foo_list are added to the graph as nodes. Pointers contained within
them to dynamically allocated objects are added as edges, and the nodes themselves are markedwith their type.
and size of the memory object, as well as type information (initially set to be unknown) and a list of
outgoing and incoming edges. For each edge, we store the offset of the pointer in the pointed-from
memory object (the source offset), and the offset pointed to in the pointed-to memory object (the desti-
nation offset). We then add to the graph a node for each static memory object, adding outgoing edges
as appropriate for the pointers contained in the object. For these static objects, we can use the type
information generated by the compiler to set the node’s type. Figure 2 shows an example of such a
graph construction.
3.2 Processing
We process the graph to propagate type information from nodes of known type (initially, the nodes
representing the static memory objects) to nodes of unknown type. We begin this processing by
marking and enqueuing all nodes of known type. While the queue is non-empty, we dequeue a node
and process it. For each of the node’s outgoing edges, we use the node’s inferred type and the edge’s
source offset within the memory object to determine the pointer type of the edge. If the destination
offset of the edge is zero (that is, if the represented pointer refers to the base of the pointed-to ob-
ject), we set the type of the edge’s destination node to be the dereferenced edge pointer type. If the
(now-identified) destination node is unmarked, we mark and enqueue the destination node. Figure
3 shows how this processing would proceed on the graph from Figure 2.
As virtually all non-leaked dynamic memory objects are ultimately rooted in a static memory
object, this process identifies type information for practically all dynamic memory objects.1 Once
processing has completed, the debugger may be queried for the type of any memory object by pro-
viding the object’s address.
1There may exist some (very small) number of dynamic memory objects that are rooted only in a thread stack or machine
register; these objects cannot be identified by this process.
Fifth Int. Workshop on Automated and Algorithmic Debugging
POSTMORTEM OBJECT TYPE IDENTIFICATION 75
static “foo_list”
0xde714060 ☎
✝ ✲
✝ ☎✞ ✆
known to be foo_t *
✆
✲✞
☎
✲✝
☎
✲✝
0xde714060
+0x0 0xde704078
+0x4 0xde701df0
+0x8 0xdefed090
+0xc 0x12e
✝ ☎✞ ✆
inferred to be foo_t
0xde704078
+0x0 0xde711008
+0x4 0xde70a4c8
+0x8 0xde709de0
+0xc 0xa0
✝ ☎✞ ✆
inferred to be foo_t
✲
✲
✲
0xdefed090
+0x0 0x1
+0x4 0xde5be840
✝ ☎✞ ✆
inferred to be bar_t
✲
0xde701df0
+0x0 0x646e6172
+0x4 0xba000000
✝ ☎✞ ✆
inferred to be char
foo_t definition
offset type
0x0 foo_t *
0x4 char *
0x8 bar_t *
0xc int
✝ ✆
☎✞
Figure 3: Processing. Based on the known type of foo_list, we infer that the node it points to (the dy-
namic memory object at 0xde714060) is a foo_t. Advancing to 0xde714060 and using the type definition
for foo_t, we determine the type of each outgoing edge; dereferencing each type yields an inference for each
pointed-to object. For example, the edge at offset zero is a pointer to a foo_t; we infer that the node pointed
to by the memory at offset zero (0xde704078) is a foo_t. Likewise, we infer that the object pointed to by the
memory at offset four is of type char and that pointed to by the memory at offset eight is of type bar_t.
4 Complexities due to C
The algorithm for postmortem type identification is straight-forward, but several complexities arise
when applying it to the C programming language in particular.
C allows (and even encourages) type casting: nothing stops the programmer from storing a
pointer to an object of one type as a pointer to a different type.2 If our algorithm encountered such
a pointer, it would incorrectly assign the destination node to be the cast-to type. Worse, the node
would be propagated as the incorrect type, potentially leading to more misidentifications and mis-
propagations. In theory, the presence of type casting in C merely prevents us from guaranteeing the
correctness of type inference; in practice, its ubiquity reduces our algorithm to a series of heuristics.
One highly effective heuristic may be to only propagate type information when the size of the
pointed-to type equals the size of the pointed-to object. This would limit incorrect behavior to cases
where the programmer is storing a pointer to an object of one type as a pointer to a different type
of identical size. However, this would also limit propagation unreasonably: even in well-written C, it
is often the case that pointed-to objects are not the size of the pointing type. These objects can occur
for many reasons, but several phenomena — discussed below — seem to be responsible for most
examples in practice.
4.1 Array declaration syntax
Most ubiquitous of these phenomena is C’s array declaration syntax. Unlike Pascal and other lan-
guages, C makes no distinction between the declaration of a pointer to a single object and a pointer
2C’s union construct can be thought of as a slightly more sanctioned variant of type casting: instead of casting to arbitrary
type, the compiler enforces that a given datummay only be interpreted as one of a specified list of types.
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to an array of objects of like type. That is, in the declaration
struct foo *bar;
“bar” could be a pointer to a single foo structure, or it could point to an array of foo structures.
4.2 Flexible array members
C performs no bounds checking on array indexing, allowing declarations of structures that are im-
plicitly followed by arrays of the type of the structure’s last member. For example, in the declaration
typedef struct foo {
int foo_bar;
int foo_baz;
mumble_t foo_mumble[1];
} foo_t;
when the programmer allocates a foo_t, the size of n−1 mumble_ts is added to the size of a foo_t
to derive the total size of the allocation; this allows for the n trailing mumble_ts to be referenced
from the allocated foo_t using C’s convenient array syntax — and without requiring an additional
memory dereference. This technique may seem arcane, but it is so widespread that ISO C99 has a
name for the last member in such a structure: the “flexible array member” (FAM)[Int99].
4.3 Structure embedding
In object-oriented systems implemented in C, it is common for structures to contain embedded
smaller structures and to pass pointers to these smaller structures to routines that track the structures
only by the smaller, embedded type. This effects a crude polymorphism: the larger structure inherits
the data of the smaller structure and methods can be called on that data by specifying a pointer to
the embedded structure as a first argument. This technique has been described at some length by Siff
et al.[SCB+99], and examples of it abound. In the Solaris kernel the most pervasive example is the
virtual filesystem: file systems typically define their own file system node type that embeds the gen-
eral system’s virtual node type, “vnode_t”[Kle86]. The virtual file system contains data structures
of vnode_ts, but each is actually the embedded vnode_t in a larger, file system-specific type.
It is less common (but by no means unheard of) for smaller structures to be used as place holders
in data structures consisting of a larger structure. That is, instead of an instance of a larger struc-
ture being pointed to by the smaller structure pointer (as was the case with structures of vnode_ts,
above), an instance of the smaller structure is pointed to by the larger structure pointer. This tech-
nique is somewhat dubious, but is most often used to implement hash tables in which a circular
linked list of table elements is desired. In this implementation, the smaller structure might be de-
clared this way:
typedef struct fooent {
struct foo *foo_prev;
struct foo *foo_next;
int foo_flags;
} fooent_t;
The first members of the larger structure will be identical to that of the smaller structure, but the
structure will contain additional data, e.g.:
typedef struct foo {
struct foo *foo_prev;
struct foo *foo_next;
int foo_flags;
struct bar foo_bar;
} foo_t;
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The hash table itself will be a table of fooent_t instead of foo_t— thereby saving space in the
table itself while still allowing circular lists of foo_t structures. This construct is critically important
to identify: it often occurs in large, contiguous arrays of the smaller structure; mispropagating these
as arrays of the larger structure would result in wide-spread misidentification.
5 Heuristics
We have developed a series of heuristics to implement the algorithm described in Section 3 while
mitigating the inherent difficulties presented in Section 4.Wherever possible, these heuristics attempt
to avoid mispropagation: no identification is preferred to misidentification.
5.1 Conservative propagation
We initialize the graph as described in Section 3.1, but instead of each node having a single type iden-
tifier, each stores a list of possible types. We propagate types out from the known nodes as described
in Section 3.2, but proceeding as conservatively as possible. Specifically:
• We do not propagate an inferred type if the size of the type is less than twice the size of the
object. These nodes may be examples of the phenomena described in Section 4; they are specif-
ically addressed by other heuristics.
• We do not propagate if the inferred type is a union.
• If we discover a new type inference for a node, we add it to the node’s type list — but we only
propagate through the node if it is unmarked. (The node is marked as we propagate through
it.) This prevents any node from being propagated with multiple, different inferences.
• If the destination offset is something other than zero (that is, if the edge does not point to the
base of an object), we propagate based on the destination type but we do not add the type to
the destination node’s type list. This allows us to conservatively propagate through embedded
types.
5.2 Embedded type detection
Embedded types are largely dealt with by virtue of conservative propagation: because type infer-
ences are only added when an edge points to the base of a structure, we can only potentially misin-
terpret a node to be its embedded type if the embedded type is the first member of the encapsulating
structure. If this is the case, conservative propagation will hopefully yield multiple inferences for the
node: because we refuse to perform further processing on any node that has multiple inferences, this
will prevent a node with an embedded type as its first member from being misinterpreted as an array
of the embedded type.
5.3 FAM detection
To detect FAMs, we visit each node for which we have exactly one inferred type, and for which
the size of the object is greater than or equal to twice the size of the type. (These are nodes for
which we made a type inference but through which we refused to propagate during conservative
propagation.) To differentiate an array of the inferred type from a type with a flexible array member,
we resort to an inelegant but effective technique: we check the last member of the inferred type;
if the structure ends with an array of size one, it is deemed to have a flexible array member and
processing advances to array propagation. This assumes that the only reason that one would have
the last member of a structure be an array of size one is to use it as a flexible array member. While
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224 bytes
✝
✞
☎✆
✆
☎
✝✞72 bytes
✆
☎
✝✞76 bytes
Remainder
Element 1
Element 0
✆
☎
✝✞76 bytes
☎
✆
✞✝152 bytes
Figure 4: Evaluating a memory object as an array of an inferred type. In this example, the size of the inferred
type is 76 bytes and the size of the memory object is 224 bytes. Were this an array of the inferred type, it would
contain only two elements — there is not enough space in 224 bytes to fit a third. A two element array would
be 152 bytes in size; if there exists a general-purpose object cache with objects smaller than 224 bytes but greater
than or equal to 152 bytes, we will conclude that this is not an array of the inferred type.
one can clearly develop counterexamples, this technique works well in practice — and the cautious
array propagation described in Section 5.5 prevents mispropagation should a counterexample be
encountered in the wild.3
5.4 Array determination
If a node is deemed to not have a FAM, we must determine if it is an array of the inferred type. To
do this, we make an important check that requires some explanation of the object-caching memory
allocator used by the Solaris kernel[Bon94]. In this allocator, objects may be allocated either by speci-
fying an object-specific cache, or they may be allocated by specifying the amount of memory desired.
Because establishing an object-specific cache presents an additional complexity for the programmer,
most objects are allocated by just specifying the object size. As all objects are allocated out of some
cache, a number of general-purpose object caches are created by the allocator itself, with each cache
corresponding to a fixed, common size. The allocator supports size-based allocations by allocating
out of the general-purpose cache with the smallest object size that will satisfy the request.
Because all objects from a given cache are of fixed size, all dynamic arrays are allocated out of a
general-purpose cache. We can use this implementation detail to perform an additional check on any
potential array: we calculate the size of the object modulo the size of the inferred type and subtract
it from the size of the object. If this value is less than or equal to the object size of the next-smaller
general-purpose cache, we know that it is not an array of the inferred type— if it were an array of the
inferred type, it would have been instead allocated out of the next-smaller cache. This determination
is shown in Figure 4.
While we have couched our array determination technique in terms of the Solaris kernel memory
allocator, it is actually applicable to any memory allocator. The efficacy of the technique will vary
depending on the degree to which the size of an allocated buffer matches the size of the allocation
request: the technique will be most effective on allocators that exactly match allocated buffer size to
requested buffer size, or otherwise track requested buffer size on a per-buffer basis.
3ISO C99 defines an alternate syntax to denote a FAM: instead of declaring foo_mumble[1], one may declare
foo_mumble[]. Assuming that this information percolates into the compiler-supplied type information, this will allow for
reliable FAM detection.
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5.5 Array propagation
In the case that an array or a FAM is detected, the type of each element of the array must be prop-
agated. Because the array and FAM determination heuristics are imperfect, array propagation runs
the risk of propagating incorrect types. To mitigate this risk, we perform an additional check before
propagating an array: we iterate through each element of the hypothesized array, checking that each
pointer member points to either NULL or valid memory. If pointer members do not satisfy these
criteria, it is assumed that we have not accurately determined that the given object is an array of the
inferred type, and we abort processing of the node. Note that uninitialized pointers can potentially
prevent an otherwise valid array from being interpreted as such. Array misinterpretation can induce
substantial cascading type misinterpretation; it is preferred to be conservative and accurate in such
cases — even if it means a lower type recognition rate. An array is propagated by propagating the
type of each array element using conservative propagation.
6 Implementation
We have implemented postmortem type identification as a debugger command in Solaris’s modu-
lar debugger, MDB[Sun02]. MDB provides an API that allows for the rapid development of plug-
gable debugging components, and includes a specific API for the processing of the type information
present in all Solaris kernel memory dumps. MDB’s architecture allows new components to easily
build on extant ones, trivializing otherwise complex tasks such as iterating over all allocatedmemory
objects.
Type identification is performed by using the “::typegraph” debugger command. To avoid
propagating incorrect type information if at all possible, ::typegraph applies our heuristics in a
series of passes, with more aggressive heuristics applied to only those nodes for which more conser-
vative heuristics have failed to make a type identification.
6.1 Initial pass
The initial pass uses the internal data structures of the Solaris kernel memory allocator to iterate over
all allocated dynamic memory objects and build the graph as described in Sections 3.1 and 5.1. Our
implementation adds an important additional step to the initialization: because the Solaris kernel
uses an object-based allocator, we can iterate over nodes from kernel memory caches of known type
and set their type accordingly. (For example, the objects allocated from the “process_cache” are
known to be of type “proc_t.”) This technique requires very little encoded knowledge of the system,
but allows for substantial preprocessing identification: our current implementation contains a table
consisting of only nine cache/type pairs, but it leads to a priori identification of up to a third of all
dynamic memory objects.
6.2 Processing passes
Our heuristics vary in the assumptions they make. To avoid mispropagation, we process the graph
as a series of passes, applying more aggressive heuristics only to those nodes for which conservative
heuristics have failed to make an identification.
6.2.1 Conservative propagation
Conservative propagation is the first processing pass, proceeding exactly as described in Section 5.1.
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6.2.2 Array determination
The array determination pass processes all nodes through which we did not propagate in the first
pass, proceeding exactly as described in Section 5.4. If a node is determined to be an array or is de-
termined to have a FAM, the array is conservatively propagated as described in Section 5.5. Because
this propagation can lead to previously unidentified nodes being identified as potential arrays, this
pass is repeated until no improvements are made.
6.2.3 Type coalescence
The type coalescence pass processes all nodes that have multiple type inferences. If a node has one
inference that is a structure and others that are not a structure, the non-structure inferences are elim-
inated. For example if an object is inferred to be either of type “char” (pointed to by a “char *”) or
type “struct frotz,” the possibilities will be coalesced into just “struct frotz.”
typegraph: pass => initial
typegraph: maximum nodes => 1401799
typegraph: actual nodes => 824313
typegraph: anchored nodes => 4992
typegraph: time elapsed, this pass => 1526 seconds
typegraph: time elapsed, total => 1526 seconds
typegraph:
typegraph: pass => 1
typegraph: nodes => 824313
typegraph: unmarked => 576829 (69.9%)
typegraph: known => 255955 (31.0%)
typegraph: conjectured => 242699 (29.4%)
typegraph: conjectured fragments => 3737 ( 0.4%)
typegraph: known or conjectured => 502391 (60.9%)
typegraph: conflicts => 35878
typegraph: candidates => 172816
typegraph: time elapsed, this pass => 44 seconds
typegraph: time elapsed, total => 1570 seconds
typegraph:
typegraph: pass => 2
typegraph: nodes => 824313
typegraph: unmarked => 275390 (33.4%)
typegraph: known => 255955 (31.0%)
typegraph: conjectured => 535919 (65.0%)
typegraph: conjectured fragments => 4049 ( 0.4%)
typegraph: known or conjectured => 795923 (96.5%)
typegraph: conflicts => 39132
typegraph: candidates => 15597
typegraph: time elapsed, this pass => 81 seconds
typegraph: time elapsed, total => 1652 seconds
typegraph:
Figure 5: ::typegraph output from the first two passes (conservative propagation and array determination)
for a dumpwith 824,313 dynamicmemory objects. First, note that a relatively large number of objects (31.0%) are
known after the initial pass. This is due to the known kernel object caches. Second, note that while conservative
propagation identifies a large number of objects (29.4%), there are still many objects (39.1%) unidentified after
the first pass. The array determination pass is critical for identifying these objects; after this pass, types are
known or conjectured for 96.5% of objects. These results are typical. Finally, note that much more time is spent
in the initial pass than in either of the subsequent passes. This is because the initial pass includes the time to
read the crash dump from disk into memory — and the crash dump is over two gigabytes in this example.
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> 33a31007088::whattype
33a31007088 is 33a31007088+0, struct seg
> 3039b042370::whattype
3039b042370 is 3039b042370+0, possibly struct dcentry
> 30062034c3c::whattype
30062034c3c is 30062034c38+4, possibly char (struct rnode.r_path)
> 329642d7878::whattype
329642d7878 is 329642d7878+0, possibly one of the following:
struct sonode (from 15925e0+8, type struct socklist)
struct vnode (from 30985f1d038+10, type struct stdata)
> 3020a383880::whattype
3020a383880 is 3020a383880+0, possibly one of the following:
struct filock (from 33cf55b2a80+80, type struct tmpnode)
struct lock_descriptor (from 4823ff82a00+8, type struct lock_descriptor)
Figure 6: Example ::whattype output for several different objects. In the first example, the object in ques-
tion is from a cache of known type. In the second example, the type of the object has been inferred (and
::whattype softens its language accordingly by only claiming that this is “possibly” the type). In the third
example, the type is inferred to be a base type, so ::whattype provides the referring type name and mem-
ber. In the final two examples, the objects have a type conflict. The first of these is an example of the idiom
discussed in Section 4.3: the embedded type (“struct vnode”) is the first member of its encapsulating type
(“struct sonode”). The second is simply a result of sloppy programming: an explicit cast has been used to
store a “struct lock_descriptor” object in a pointer to “struct filock”— despite the fact that the two
structures have nothing to do with one another! Fortunately, such conflicts are rare; typically fewer than 0.1% of
objects are identified as having type conflicts.
6.2.4 Non-array type inference
The non-array type inference pass is the least conservative. It processes those objects that meet the
following conditions:
• The object has a single type inference.
• The size of the type inference is less than half the object size.
• The object was not identified as an array.
These objects—which are not propagated by earlier passes— are propagated in this pass as being
a non-array of the inferred type. This pass is necessary to propagate objects that have embedded
types as their first member, but for which only the embedded type was inferred.
6.3 Type identification
Once processing is complete, the type of an arbitrary object may be queried by specifying its address
to the “::whattype” debugger command. If an inference has been drawn for the specified object,
its type is displayed. If the type has been identified to be a base type (e.g., char, int, void, etc.),
the type and member of the referring object is displayed. If multiple inferences have been drawn for
the object, all of the conflicting types are displayed, along with the nodes that led to each inference.
Figure 6 shows some example output from ::whattype.
6.4 Manual intervention
If recognition rate is low (or, from a more practical perspective, if the object of interest is not au-
tomatically identified), it can be useful to know which node is the greatest impediment to further
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recognition. If the user can — by hook or by crook — determine the true type of this node, more
type identification should be possible. To facilitate this, we therefore define the reach of a node to
be the number of unknown nodes that could potentially be identified were the node’s type known.
We determine the reach by performing a depth-first pass through the graph. The node of greatest
reach (along with the number of reachable unknown nodes) is reported upon completion of a post-
processing pass. We added an additional debugger command, ::istype, to allow the type to be set
manually. When a type is set manually, the graph is immediately reprocessed.
Manual intervention in the presence of imperfect heuristics allows for a paradigm of feedback-
based postmortem debugging, where automatic inferences by the debugger about the system lead to
further inferences by the user about the system — which in turn lead to more automatic inferences
and so on. While this is intriguing in principle, we have found that the high rate of type recognition
has not necessitated its use in practice.
7 Other applications
While debugging buffer overrun corruption was our original motivating application for postmortem
type identification, we have discovered it to have a wide range of applications to postmortem de-
bugging.
7.1 Use-after-free corruption
Postmortem type identification may be of help in debugging other variants of memory corruption.
In particular, it may help root-cause use-after-free corruption, in which a memory object is used after
it is deallocated. After buffer overrun corruption, use-after-free corruption has been found to be
the most common type of memory corruption[SC91]. This pathology can be difficult to diagnose: it
manifests itself as “random” corruption. If the object as reallocated is of different type than the object
as erroneously used after being freed — and if the freed object is still present in its original data
structure — postmortem type identification will explicitly identify the object as a type conflict. By
providing the two types in conflict, postmortem type identification considerably focuses the search
for errant code.
7.2 Postmortem lock detection
When debugging parallel software systems postmortem, it is often useful to know which mutually
exclusive regions a given thread of control has access to. Such regions are entered by acquiring a
mutual exclusion lock (“mutex”); the problem distills to determining which mutexes are owned in
the system and by whom. Knowing the regions that a thread of control has exclusive access to sheds
light on the state of the system at the time of the failure, and therefore aids analysis into the failure’s
root cause.
The simplest way to solve this problem is to log each entry to and exit from a mutually exclusive
region. However, in parallel software systems with fine-grained locking, mutexes are acquired and
released far too frequently to allow for any sort of logging without inducing an unacceptable impact
on performance.
If mutexes are implementedwith a single C type (as they are in the Solaris kernel— a “kmutex_t”)
we can build on postmortem type identification to find all held locks: after type identification has
completed, we iterate over all nodes of inferred type, and look for any embedded mutex types.
Adding the offset of the embedded mutex type to the base address of the node yields the address
of the mutex. Because parallel systems must be able to determine the owning thread of a mutex
given its address (to correctly implement priority inheritance, guard against recursive entry, allow
for adaptive blocking behavior, etc.), we can build a system-specific way to get from the mutex to the
owning thread.
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> ::findlocks
300182d9a78 (struct segkp_data.kp_lock) is owned by 140a000
3001c69ca80 (struct anon_map.serial_lock) is owned by 3008de45a40
3000d2c46f0 is owned by 3008de45a40
3000c43b658 (struct anon_map.serial_lock) is owned by 30018a7bce0
3001aabdca8 (struct anon_map.serial_lock) is owned by 30018a7a2a0
30011b8c390 (struct anon_map.serial_lock) is owned by 30011bb6d20
30011b8c898 (struct anon_map.serial_lock) is owned by 30018a73d00
30011b8c940 (struct anon_map.serial_lock) is owned by 30018a7ad20
3008423e740 (struct anon_map.serial_lock) is owned by 30078e06d20
30320df6118 (struct anon_map.serial_lock) is owned by 30084296800
300841be820 (struct anon_map.serial_lock) is owned by 3001ccfd260
30320f5dcf0 (struct anon_map.serial_lock) is owned by 3000c442fe0
14b4a18 (pageout_mutex) is owned by 2a100527d40
14cc7a8 (ufs_scan_lock) is owned by 3000c4437c0
Figure 7: Example ::findlocksoutput. The address of the lock is shown on the left; the address of the owning
thread structure is shown on the right. For static locks (such as “pageout_mutex” and “ufs_scan_lock” in
the above), the symbol name is provided. For locks embedded in dynamic objects, the structure type of the
object and member name of the embedded lock are provided. ::findlocks output should be taken only to be
advisory; if type recognition is anything less than 100%, it will not find all held locks.
We have implemented an additional MDB command, “::findlocks,” that implements this for
the Solaris kernel; its output is shown in Figure 7.
7.3 False sharing detection
In caching SMP systems, memory is kept coherent through a variety of different protocols. Typically,
these protocols dictate that only a single cache may have a given line of memory in a dirty state.
If a different cache wishes to write to the dirty line, the new cache must first read-to-own the dirty
line from the owning cache. The size of the line used for coherence (the coherence granularity) has
an immediate ramification for parallel software: because only one cache may own a line at a given
time, one wishes to avoid a situation where two or more small, disjoint data structures are both
contained within a single line and accessed in parallel on disjoint CPUs. This situation — so-called
false sharing[DSR+93] — can induce suboptimal scalability in otherwise scalable software.
Historically, one has been able to find false sharing only with some combination of keen intuition
and good luck. Building on postmortem type information we can — from a system crash dump
— detect the potentially most egregious cases of false sharing. This pushes postmortem analysis
into an entirely new domain: analyzing a system crash dump for potential (but as of yet unknown)
performance problems.
We can detect false sharing by iterating over all nodes, looking for nodes that satisfy the following
criteria:
• The node is an array. That is, the node was either determined to be of a C type that is an
array type, or the node was inferred to be an array in the array determination pass of type
identification.
• Each element of the array is a structure that is smaller than the coherence granularity.
• The total size of the array is greater than the coherence granularity.
• Each element of the array is a structure that contains within it a synchronization primitive
(mutex, readers/writer lock, condition variable or semaphore). We use the presence of a syn-
chronization primitive as a crude indicator that the disjoint elements of the array are accessed
in parallel.
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> ::findfalse
ADDR SYMBOL TYPE SZ TOTSIZE
7839fc30 fx_list_lock struct mutex 8 128
7839f6b0 fx_cb_list_lock struct mutex 8 128
78360448 t_hashmutex struct mutex 8 512
782e2418 kcpc_ctx_llock struct mutex 8 512
14c3438 tcp_bind_fanout struct tbf_s 16 8192
14c2438 tcp_listen_fanout struct tf_s 16 4096
14c1428 tcp_acceptor_fanout struct tf_s 16 4096
14bd2e8 ipc_tcp_listen_fanout_v6 struct icf_s 16 4096
14bb628 tbftable struct tbf 56 1792
30000c07e80 - struct fifolock 32 288
30000c07d60 - struct fifolock 32 288
30000c07c40 - struct fifolock 32 288
30000b70000 - struct icf_s 16 8192
30000b6c000 - struct icf_s 16 8192
30000b62000 - struct tbf_s 16 8192
300008d1000 - struct mutex 8 4096
30004153530 - struct uf_entry 40 2688
3000284eaa8 - struct uf_entry 40 2688
3000284e028 - struct uf_entry 40 2688
30004149538 - struct uf_entry 40 2688
30004148038 - struct uf_entry 40 2688
30006cc7540 - struct uf_entry 40 2688
30000c01520 - struct uf_entry 40 2688
30000c00aa0 - struct uf_entry 40 2688
30000c00020 - struct uf_entry 40 2688
3000256f9c0 - struct uf_entry 40 1312
3000256f4a0 - struct uf_entry 40 1312
30000061988 - struct smfree 24 192
30000ca0000 - struct irb 32 65536
30000ae6000 - struct mutex 8 262144
30000920000 - struct plock 8 124624
30000916000 - struct _kcondvar 2 31156
Figure 8: Example of ::findfalse output. All the above structures can potentially suffer from false sharing.
One of these (“struct uf_entry”) was deemed important enough to fix immediately. Others are either under
investigation or are in data structures that are not sufficiently parallel to merit eliminating the false sharing.
Any node satisfying these criteria is identified as an object that could potentially suffer from false
sharing, and the node’s address, type, type size, and total size are provided as output. We have
implemented this as a “::findfalse” debugger command; its output is shown in Figure 8.
While there are some instances of false sharing that do not meet the above criteria (e.g., if the
synchronization for each element is handled in a separate structure, or if the elements are only ma-
nipulated with atomic memory operations), these criteria yield many examples of false sharing with-
out swamping the user with false positives. (As a proof of concept, ::findfalse has found several
known instances of false sharing in the Solaris kernel, and further revealed two serious — and hith-
erto unknown — instances of false sharing.)
8 Future work
8.1 Better recognition
In our experience, the greatest impediments to type recognition are data structures that are stored
only with pointers to base types that are subsequently cast before every use. This may seem arcane,
but it comes up frequently in the Solaris kernel: device driver instances register an object that repre-
sents their state with a framework that stores it as a “void *,” handing it back to the device driver
as needed. Because these objects are never stored with a pointer to the true type, we cannot identify
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their type. We would ideally like to extend postmortem type identification to be able to identify these
structures, perhaps by extending the interfaces that create such state to explicitly specify type.
8.2 User-level core files
Postmortem type identification has proved very useful for debugging Solaris kernel crash dumps; a
logical extension is to allow for type identification in user-level core files. The work required to do
this is relatively small: MDB can already process user-level core files and the slab allocator used in
the Solaris kernel has recently been made available to user-level processes[BA01]. The only imped-
iment is the addition of the type information consumed by MDB to user-level core files; this work
is currently underway. Furthermore, because multithreaded applications on Solaris are forced to use
well-defined types for synchronization primitives, we expect to be able to provide ::findlocks
and ::findfalse for user-level core files as well.
9 Conclusions
We have described a mechanism to provide automatic postmortem identification of arbitrary mem-
ory objects. While the technique can in principle be applied to any typed language, we have focused
on the specific issues presented by C. We have described heuristics to overcome the obstacles inher-
ent in postmortem type identification for C-based systems, and have described our implementation
on one such system, the Solaris kernel. We have found postmortem type identification to be very
useful in debugging buffer overrun memory corruption in optimized systems — problems that were
practically undebuggable prior to this work. Moreover, we have found that our heuristics yield a
sufficiently high recognition rate to allow for additional novel applications, including postmortem
identification of held locks and postmortem identification of structures that may induce false shar-
ing. Therewill certainly bemore applications of postmortem object type identification, some of which
will presumably rely on near-perfect type recognition; there is therefore great incentive to develop
further heuristics to improve the object recognition rate as much as possible.
Availability
The debugger commands described in this work — ::typegraph, ::whattype, ::istype,
::findlocks and ::findfalse — have been integrated into Solaris, and will be available in
the October 2003 update of Solaris 9. More information on the availability of Solaris can be found
at http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/.
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